🧵 Ship of Theseus
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 14:27:37 UTC No. 16101262
>The year is 2100 and biological immortality has been achieved
>We've achieved methods and procedures to 3D print brain tissue and successfully integrate it into a persons physiology
>Over time, you suffer from dementia, brain cancer, strokes etc.
>You replace the lost tissue with all it's former neuronal structures throughout your hundreds of years of living
Are you still the same person? How can we be sure you're experiencing the same type of conciousness you did before? Where would your ideas, memories, ambitions and personality really come from?
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 14:42:07 UTC No. 16101287
read wittgenstein and stfu
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 14:52:09 UTC No. 16101297
>>16101262
>Are you still the same person?
are you ever?
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 14:59:18 UTC No. 16101314
>>16101262
>Are you still the same person?
Does it matter? Are you still the same person you were when you were 5?
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 19:05:12 UTC No. 16101673
Your body naturally already does this. Little by little it's replacing itself all the time. All multicellular life are living ships of Theseus.
But maybe that's not a bad thing. Pic related.
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 19:18:04 UTC No. 16101694
>>16101673
>Because hoverbike
He's right tho
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 20:52:30 UTC No. 16101898
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 22:37:54 UTC No. 16102142
>>16101673
That is not exactly accurate though. The brain does not replace itself after 7 years. Without any trauma neuroregeneration is so minimal that most people die with the smae brain cells they mature as. Still it is possible and we know of cases who had their mature brain cells be replaced by new copies after severe trauma, even 70% of their entire brain cells. I think that gradual neuroreplacement is the only viable method to change the bery substrate of one's mind. As long as we understand the mind as emergent property of various brain/body processes accumulating to the creation of this mind.
Stranger yet is the idea of replacing brain cells not with artifical neurons but with virutal ones until all of one's mind is emerging from a software and thus achieve a true digital mind upload.
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 22:41:58 UTC No. 16102148
>>16102142
Hold on there fella
Are you saying the minute impact tremors from hitting a punching bag for 20 minutes that cause me to have a mild headache might actually be causing some sort of autophagic process where my brain replaces old neurons with new neurons that function the same?
Anonymous at Thu, 28 Mar 2024 22:43:16 UTC No. 16102152
>>16101673
But wouldn't this mean there is a component of our body that isn't pysical?
Or does this mean that our body is so physical you can just print and past components with no interruption?
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 01:56:07 UTC No. 16102512
>>16101297
>are you ever?
No
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WK
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jom
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 02:06:33 UTC No. 16102525
>>16101262
>Consider a ship of Theseus
>Oh my model of consciousness doesn't make this consideration meaningful anyway :^)
At any rate the ship of Theseus isn't perfectly analogous anyway; simply doing the operation really really slowly changes nothing. I can replace neurons one at a time with lego bricks and not die for quite a while, doing it slowly or quickly doesn't make it more of less technically feasible.
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 03:02:26 UTC No. 16102580
If you do it slowly then you stay "yourself".
If you replace too much too fast then it's not "you" anymore.
>muh copy is me tho!!!
Go kill yourself then. I will not follow you retard copies.
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 03:03:39 UTC No. 16102582
>>16102525
Time does matter when it comes to the brain. It's takes time for neurons to find each other and make those pathways that create your individual mind.
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 08:20:23 UTC No. 16102983
>>16101262
>Are you still the same person?
yes.
>How can we be sure you're experiencing the same type of conciousness you did before?
doesn't matter. you're not experiencing the same type of conciousness you had when you were a child either. yet you are the same person.
>Where would your ideas, memories, ambitions and personality really come from?
you are not these things.
you are either the continuity of events you experience or the protocol that governs the interaction of your body parts. maybe both. your choice.
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 20:07:33 UTC No. 16103682
Fundamentally, there needs to be "bidirectional" thought for any transfer in order to preserve ego continuity. If we imagine a mind as like water or some fluid, and the brain as a vessel for it, then just "pouring" the mind into a new vessel doesn't preserve continuity; the new mind in the new vessel can't communicate back to old mind in the old vessel.
However, if we consider simply connecting the two vessels and siphoning the mind from one to the other (at whatever speed) while the new mind can talk to the old mind as the latter is transferred to the former, then continuity is maintained and death does not occur.
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:05:25 UTC No. 16103748
>>16101262
Nature abhors discontinuities. Life is a process, not a substance. If you can “fool“ your electrochemistry to never "perceive“ an interruption of the flow, you will remain the same person.
>does that mean you die during anaesthesia?
No. The statement above is not a biconditional. The flow interrupt criterion only comes into play when your neurons are being destroyed.
>>16101314
Trivially yes on account of the same exact neurons, down to most molecules, being the same.
I know above I said "you are not a piece of physical matter", but the presence of the same exact matter always implies continuity of process. But OP's scenario is such that we actually have to answer the question what is the *minimal* carrier of continuity of consciousness. The answer is a certain unbroken electrochemical process.
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:08:55 UTC No. 16103755
>>16101262
>Are you still the same person
Wasn't it that all parts of the human body get replaced every x years? I'd say yes, then
>>16101314
>Are you still the same person you were when you were 5?
Same consistent stream of sentience, so I'd go with yes. Just because you get smarter/wiser doesn't mean you are someone else
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:11:17 UTC No. 16103763
>>16103748
>The flow interrupt criterion only comes into play when your neurons are being destroyed.
you can destroy your neurons with various drugs. do you continually become someone else taking over your body if you do drugs that fry your neurons?
what about being in clinical death, zero blooflow, zero brain activity, just a hunk of cold meat. sliced open, some blood cloth removed with some of your neurons, brought back to life. is your body inhabited by a different person than yourself anon? think the wife would be able to tell?
Anonymous at Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:14:01 UTC No. 16103766
what is so weirdly unexplicably (scientifically speaking) about stopping all electric activity and starting it again? what fucking science says anything about your consciousness being somehow tied to a continuous electrical flow and if it stops for any amount of time, (You) die and someone new who isn't aware (yeah I shit you not) takes over your whole fucking life.
fucking w o w
Anonymous at Sat, 30 Mar 2024 15:27:13 UTC No. 16104876
>b
Anonymous at Sat, 30 Mar 2024 15:55:31 UTC No. 16104908
>>16101287
>reading philosonigger babble
Back to /x/ with you
Anonymous at Sun, 31 Mar 2024 02:47:11 UTC No. 16105781
>>16101262
>Are you still the same person? How can we be sure you're experiencing the same type of conciousness you did before?
define consciousness first
>but-
no.
define it and at least 90% of these autistic online debates end before they begin
Anonymous at Sun, 31 Mar 2024 04:41:50 UTC No. 16105892
>>16101262
There is zero evidence that conciousness even exists. As such any further questions relating to conciousness have no answer. The best we can do is make sure the observable behavour of the system is in line with previous observabed behavour.